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Abstract—This paper describes the design of a programmable
coprocessor for Public Key Cryptography (PKC) on an FPGA.
The implementation provides a very broad range of functions
together with countermeasures against Side-Channel Analysis
(SCA) attacks. The functions are implemented in a hierarchical
manner, where all levels are accessible by the user. This makes
the coprocessor very flexible and particularly suitable to be
used in embedded environments where the border between
hardware and software needs to be decided depending on the
application. Especially for RSA, the resulting implementation on
an XC3S5000 FPGA, from the low-cost Spartan series of Xilinx,
shows comparable performance figures compared to the state-of-
the-art in PKC coprocessors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Public Key Cryptography (PKC) is the basis for security
in digital information systems. Key establishment and digital
signatures are used to ensure confidentiality, authentication and
data integrity. These services are indispensable in network
applications such as e-mail, e-commerce and e-banking, but
PKC also provides embedded security in mobile applications
and credit cards.
Depending on the application, a suitable implementation
platform needs to be chosen. For some systems a general pur-
pose microprocessor is satisfactory, while others achieve high
performance through cryptographic coprocessors in hardware.
Examples of high performance applications are ATMs, trusted
computing platforms and biometric devices.
When very high performance is required or when a high
volume of coprocessors is needed, ASICs are chosen as
implementation platforms. In this case, the reconfigurability of
FPGAs is only used for prototyping. However, because of the
efforts of FPGA manufacturing companies, the performance
gap between ASICs and FPGAs becomes small enough to
introduce the trend that FPGAs are more and more used as
end products. Especially for low-volume designs FPGAs are
very interesting target platforms. FPGAs come with different
characteristics and prices. Aiming at cheap products, Xilinx
introduced its low-cost Spartan series. The cost of a Spartan
FPGA ranges from 20 to 300, but its performance is far below
the latest Virtex FPGAs of Xilinx [4]. Because our goal was
to develop a cheap FPGA implementation, we used a Spartan
for our coprocessor. This made the challenge for competitive
performance figures bigger, but nevertheless resulted in an
implementation that is comparable to the state-of-the-art in
PKC coprocessors.
The most widely used standard for PKC is RSA, which
was invented by Rivest, Shamir and Aldeman in 1978 [18].
However, because of its much shorter key lengths, Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC), outperforms RSA in silicon area
and speed [15], [9]. For this reason, many resource restricted
applications are evolving towards ECC. From these observa-
tions, it becomes clear that there is a need for PKC coproces-
sors supporting both RSA and ECC. Whereas RSA imposes
operations in prime fields, ECC is usually performed using
either prime fields or binary extension fields. Our coprocessor
provides RSA as well as ECC, where ECC is supported in
both fields.
In the mid 1990s, Kocher et al. published some Side-
Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks [12]. Because FPGA imple-
mentations have been repeatedly shown to be side-channel
susceptible, countermeasures are indispensable in our PKC
coprocessor [17], [22], [24]. For both RSA and ECC, we
provide countermeasures against SCA.
To provide maximum flexibility, e.g. for programming new
algorithms, the user should have access to all operations used
by RSA and ECC. This is achieved by implementing the
control logic in a hierarchical manner, where all levels in the
hierarchy are available for the user. To reduce the complexity
of the control logic we use a modular approach: the lowest-
level functions in the hierarchy are reused by many higher-
level functions. Providing all functions in hardware gives
performance and security advantages compared to software
approaches like instruction set extensions, where security
depends on hard-to-predict branch delays and cache effects.
In summary, this paper introduces an FPGA implementation
of a programmable PKC coprocessor. It provides RSA and
ECC as well as all underlying field operations and counter-
measures against SCA attacks. This results in a very flexible
solution providing a broad range of functions. The hierarchical
approach keeps complexity under control, which allows the
design to be implemented on a low-cost Spartan FPGA.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some
theoretical background on RSA and ECC. Section 3 gives an
overview of the state-of-the-art in PKC coprocessors. In Sect. 4
the implementation of the coprocessor is described, while
Sect. 5 lists the performance and area results and compares
our design to the state-of-the-art in PKC coprocessors. Finally,
Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
II. PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
In this section, we elaborate on the theoretical background
that is needed to understand the algorithms that are imple-
mented in our coprocessor. Sect. II-A and II-B elaborate
on RSA and ECC (in GF(p) and GF(2n)), respectively. In
Sect. II-C some countermeasures for Side-Channel Analysis
(SCA) attacks are introduced.
A. RSA
In the RSA standard for PKC [18], the private key of a
user consists of two large primes p and q and an exponent d.
The public key consists of a pair (N, e), where N = p · q is
the modulus (at least 1024 bits) and an exponent e is such
that e = d−1 mod λ(N). The corresponding p, q and d are
kept secret. To encrypt a message M the user computes C =
Me mod N and decryption is described by M = Cd mod
N ≡M1+kϕ(N) ≡M mod N . The previous equality follows
from Fermat’s theorem and the fact that λ = lcm(p − 1, q −
1). The RSA function is the modular exponentiation with the
public exponent e and the private exponent d is referred to as
the trapdoor to invert the function.
By means of the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), the
speed for the RSA decryption scheme can be increased up to
4 times [10]. This possibility is very attractive for practical
applications.
B. ECC
In ECC [15], [9], the equivalent operation of the modular
exponentiation in RSA is point multiplication, which multi-
plies a point P on an elliptic curve with a scalar k, resulting
in another point on the curve Q = kP . The scalar serves as
the key, while the coordinates of the points contain the data.
For cryptographic purposes, elliptic curves are defined in
finite fields. The most commonly used fields are prime fields
(GF(p)) and binary extension fields (GF(2n)). Point multi-
plication is performed by repeated point doublings and point
additions. These point operations consist of operations in the
underlying finite field.
C. Countermeasures against SCA Attacks
The first step in preventing SCA attacks, in particular power
analysis attacks, is implementing countermeasures against
Simple Power Analysis (SPA). Using an SPA attack an adver-
sary tries to extract secret information by analyzing a single
power trace of the implementation while it is executing an
operation. The most important action in securing an imple-
mentation against SPA attacks, is making the power graphs
look indistinguishable, even if different secret information is
processed. This includes removing conditional branches.
To prevent Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks [11],
[12], which use many power consumption traces together with
some statistical analysis, the RSA exponent is “blinded”. The
blinded exponent d′ is obtained using d′ = d+ϕ·r, where r is a
random number (of typically 20 bits) and ϕ is the Euler totient
function of the modulus N . More details on exponent blinding
are given in [11], [12], where it is proven that gd = gd
′
. This
property makes it possible to choose a different r for each
exponentation, changing the exponent without changing the
intended result. Because DPA is based on power consumption
data for many executions of the algorithm using the same
key, exponent blinding succeeds in protecting the cryptosystem
against first-order DPA attacks.
For ECC, resistance against DPA attacks can be achieved
by key blinding, k′ = k + O · r, where k′ is the blinded
key, O is the order of the point and r is a random number
(of typically 20 bits). Because kP and k′P always result in
the same point on the elliptic curve, this method is effective
against first-order DPA attacks when the random number is
changed for every execution of the point multiplication. In
addition, we implemented another precaution for preventing
DPA attacks: Point randomization exploits the fact that the
Z-coordinate can be chosen randomly when using projective
coordinates [5].
III. PREVIOUS WORK
Goodman and Chandrakasan proposed a Domain-Specific
Reconfigurable Cryptographic Processor (DSRCP) in [6]. The
instruction set definition of the DSRCP was dictated by the
IEEE 1363 Public Key Cryptography Standard document [8].
The DSRCP performs a variety of algorithms ranging from
modular integer arithmetic to elliptic curve arithmetic. The
various complex modular arithmetic operations are imple-
mented using microcode, while simple operations are imple-
mented directly in hardware. Multiplication is performed using
Montgomery multiplication. For a detailed survey on finite
fields multipliers and processors for PKC see [1]. The DSRCP
processor is fabricated in a 0.25-µm CMOS technology. The
goal of this coprocessor was to achieve an energy-efficient
implementation.
Schaumont and Verbauwhede introduced an elliptic curve
processor over GF(2n) in [20], [21]. The architecture has a
layered structure with the layers corresponding to the opera-
tions described in the security pyramid. The authors propose
a language and simulation environment that allows to explore
the design of security domain specific processors at a high
abstraction level.
Bednara et al. gave a comparison of several ways for hard-
ware implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystems in [2].
They especially focused on FPGA based implementations.
There exists also some related work on so-called dual field
ECC, which deals with processors that can support both type
of fields. Wolkerstorfer [23] proposed a single arithmetic unit
that supports addition and multiplication for prime and binary
fields. A scalable dual-field ECC processor is described in the
work by Satoh and Takano [19].
An example of the utilization of CRT is presented by
Grosscha¨dl in [7]. In this paper the multiplier architecture
of an RSA chip is presented. The multiplier datapath is
reconfigurable to execute either one 1 024 or two 512 bit
modular exponentiation in parallel.
The contribution of our paper is that all levels in the
hierarchy of instructions are available to the user, which makes
the processor completely programmable. Different from the
work mentioned above, we implemented many countermea-
sures against SCA attacks. The FPGA resources were used in
an optimal way to provide maximal performance and security
on a low-cost FPGA.
IV. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION
Our programmable PKC coprocessor supports a broad range
of operations. To keep complexity under control, we intro-
duced many levels of hierarchy. This section describes the
implementation following a top-down approach.
A. The architecture
RAM
DPHL LL
Fig. 1. Architecture of the PKC coprocessor (DP = data path, RAM =
data memory, LL = lower-level FSMs, HL = higher-level FSMs, thick lines
= data, thin lines = control).
Figure 1 shows the general architecture of our coprocessor,
where the thick and the thin lines are used to represent the data
flow and the control flow, respectively. The logic controlling
the data path (DP ) and the data memory (RAM ) is divided
into two parts, which both consist of Finite State Machines
(FSMs):
• the lower-level FSMs (LL): These FSMs are directly
controlling the data path and the data memory.
• the higher-level FSMs (HL): To reduce the number of
multiplexors, these FSMs are not connected to the data
path or the data memory. The HL FSMs control the LL
FSMs and take care of the user commands. This keeps
complexity under control, because the LL functions are
reused for different HL functions.
The data memory is not only accessible by the LL FSMs, but
also by the user. Before sending a command to the coprocessor,
the user writes the input operands and parameters to predefined
addresses in the data memory. After the coprocessor has
executed the command, the user reads the result from a
predefined address in the data memory.
In the next three paragraphs, we describe the implemen-
tation in more detail. Section IV-B elaborates on the data
path, the data memory and the interaction with the lower-
level FSMs, while Sect. IV-C explains how the higher-level
FSMs work. Section IV-D addresses the countermeasures that
are implemented to prevent DPA attacks.
B. Controlling the Data Path
In Fig. 2 the data path, data memory and lower-level FSMs
are depicted in more detail. Based on this figure, these three
parts are described in the following paragraphs.
1) Data Path: The data path consists of three main parts:
• a GF(p) arithmetic unit: This unit performs an inte-
ger multiplication using the dedicated multipliers on
the FPGA. Furthermore, it contains and an integer
adder/subtracter.
• a GF(2n) arithmetic unit: This unit consists of a GF(2n)
Montgomery multiplier and a GF(2n) adder.
• two shift registers for the key (denoted by << and
>> in Fig. 2): Because our coprocessor evaluates an
RSA key from MSB to LSB and an ECC key LSB to
MSB, a left-shift and a right-shift register are foreseen
in the data path. The reason for this difference in key
evaluation comes from the fact that ECC uses smaller
operand lengths than RSA. This makes it possible to
perform an elliptic curve point doubling and addition in
parallel without increasing the size of the data path. Point
multiplication algorithms evaluating the key from LSB to
MSB inherently allow this kind of parallelism [14]. For
RSA, the bigger operand size made us choose for a more
memory-efficient MSB to LSB algorithm [14].
2) Data Memory: For the data memory, the dedicated RAM
blocks on the FPGA are used in dual-port configuration. One
port is controlled by the user, the shift registers and the GF(p)
unit, while the other one is controlled by the GF(p) unit.
3) Lower-level FSMs: The lower-level control part consists
of five FSMs:
• integer mul: FSM controlling the integer multiplier.
• integer add/sub: FSM controlling the integer
adder/subtracter
• GF(2n) mul: FSM controlling the GF(2n) multiplier
• GF(2n) add: FSM controlling the GF(2n) adder
• key: FSM controlling the shift registers for the evaluation
of the key bits
The first four FSMs execute the same general sequence.
First, they transfer the data from the data memory into the
input registers of one of the arithmetic units. Next, they control
the operation to be performed. Finally, they make sure the
result is written into the required address in the data memory.
The key FSM addresses the data memory to load the key
into one of the key registers and controls the shift operation
when the next bit needs to be evaluated.
C. Executing the User Commands
The higher-level FSMs are horizontally divided into seven
groups according to their operand length. Figure 3 shows these
groups, which are all connected to the user through a control
bus. They all receive the same 8-bit user command, but only
one group recognizes the command value and executes it.
The “pass” group consists of only one FSM, which makes
sure the user can reach the lower-level functions. The other
groups consist of many levels of hierarchy in the vertical
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Fig. 2. Data path, RAM and lower-level FSMs of the PKC coprocessor.
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Fig. 3. Higher-level FSMs of the PKC coprocessor.
direction. As an example, these levels are depicted in Fig. 4
for group 512 and 256.
To explain our methodology, we elaborate on the left side
of Fig. 4, which shows the hierarchy of operations for group
512. The top level function or level 1 function in group 512,
CRT_w, performs RSA-CRT with key blinding as a counter-
measure for DPA attacks. CRT_w uses the level 2 function
RSA_w, i.e. modular exponentiation with key blinding, and
the level 5 functions submod and mulmod, i.e. modular
subtraction and modular multiplication, respectively. Further-
more CRT_w needs an integer multiplication and addition,
which is the reason for its connection with the LL FSMs.
The key blinding in RSA_w is executed through the LL
FSMs, while the level 3 function RSA_wo performs a modular
exponentiation, consisting of only modular multiplications
(level 5). The level 5 functions are only connected to the LL
functions.
This methodology has been applied in a systematic way
to the other operations. The result is a coprocessor which
supports RSA up to 4096 bits, RSA using CRT up to 8192
bits, ECC in GF(p) up to 256 bits and ECC in GF(2n) up to
251 bits.
To provide a flexible solution, we made all the levels in
the hierarchy accessible. In this way, unimplemented or new
cryptographic algorithms can still be executed by the user,
which makes our PKC coprocessor fully programmable.
Note that modular multiplication in GF(p) is implemented
as a higher-level function using the integer multiplication and
addition that are provided by the data path, while modular
multiplication in GF(2n) is implemented directly in the data
path. The reason for this difference is that the FPGA provides
dedicated integers multipliers, which can only be used for
GF(p) multiplication. The GF(2n) multiplier is implemented
completely on the reconfigurable slices of the FPGA, which
makes it more advantageous to provide a modular multiplier
directly controllable by the lower-level FSMs.
D. Side-channel Security
Because FPGA implementations have been repeatedly
shown to be side-channel susceptible (see [17], [22], [24]), we
implemented several countermeasures against side-channel at-
tacks. This can be seen from Fig 4, which also shows that some
operations can be performed with or without countermeasures,
allowing the user to decide on the trade-off between security
and performance. For completeness, we briefly summarize the
implemented countermeasures in this section.
1) Time-constant Operations: To prevent SPA attacks, we
made sure that all operations are time-constant.
For RSA, we implemented the k-ary method to speed
up modular exponentiation [14]. When multiplication is not
skipped, this method has no conditional branches. To make
the power graphs of the squarings and the multiplications look
similar, they are performed using the same multiplier.
For ECC, we made sure that the algorithms for point
doubling and point addition are balanced, i.e. in every step of
the algorithms, the same finite field operations are performed.
CRT_w
RSA_w
RSA_wo
mulmodsubmod
mul add/sub
invmod
pdouble padd
mulmod
pmul_wo
pmul_w
addmod submod
mul add/sub
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level 3
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pass251b256512102420484096
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Fig. 4. Hierarchy for the 512 group (left) and the 256 group (right).
TABLE I
IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS FOR OUR PKC COPROCESSOR.
operating frequency 66 MHz
# FPGA CLBs 4826 (58% of the FPGA)
block RAM 66 x 16 kbit
dedicated multipliers 66 x (16x16)
Just like for RSA, finite field squarings and multiplications are
executed on the same multiplier.
2) Key Blinding: To prevent first-order DPA attacks, we
implemented key blinding for both RSA and ECC, which was
explained in Sect. II-C. The examples in Fig. 4 clearly show
how this is reflected in the hierarchy of instructions: the top
level functions use the LL FSMs for integer multiplication
and integer addition.
3) Point Randomization: Elliptic curve point doubling and
addition are performed using projective coordinates. As ex-
plained in Sect. II-C, this allows for point randomization to
be included. This countermeasure is added to the algorithms
for point doubling and addition.
V. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS AND COMPARISON
Table 1 gives the implementation results of our PKC
coprocessor, which was implemented on an XC3S5000-
5FG1156. The synthesis and place & route were done using
Xilinx ISE 8.1, with small area as optimization goal.
The reason that we did not try to gain performance by filling
up the FPGA more than 58%, is that we wanted a compact
version for embedded applications. Because many of these
applications do not have a high speed clock, it does not make
sense to push the implementation for speed. This way, we also
leave room for other functionality to be added later.
Table 2 compares our implementation to other program-
mable coprocessors on FPGA.
It is hard to make a fair comparison, because different
implementation platforms were used. Moreover, our solution
includes RSA as well as ECC, where ECC is supported for
both prime and binary extension fields. The other implemen-
tations only support a subset of these operations. However,
we can conclude that our implementation shows competitive
results for RSA compared to previously designed coprocessors
on more advanced FPGA platforms. This was achieved by
optimally utilizing the dedicated features on the FPGA, such
as RAM blocks and multipliers.
The reason that the other implementations in the table
outperform our solution for ECC, is that we added security
on many levels of the design, as explained in Sect. IV-D.
Moreover, our implementation gives a general solution without
fixing polynomials or primes and shows results for larger
primes. Also, combining ECC with RSA deteriorates the
performance of ECC, because a lot of resources are used to
support RSA, which makes the area-speed trade-off disadvan-
tageous for the latency of ECC.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a programmable coprocessor that provides
both RSA and ECC, where ECC is supported in prime as
well as binary extension fields. To provide complete flexibility,
we made all underlying operations accessible for the user by
adopting a hierarchical approach. Complexity is kept under
control by modularity: higher-level functions are sharing the
lowest-level operations. The result is an FPGA implementation
that is optimized for compactness and therefore leaves enough
room for other functionality to be added in the future.
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF OUR SOLUTION TO OTHER PROGRAMMABLE COPROCESSORS ON FPGA.
reference implementation comments
platform
this work XC3S5000 all operations were implemented
fully programmable solution
countermeasures included
[3] XC40250XV only RSA-CRT was implemented up to 1024 bits
[13] XC2V6000 only RSA-CRT was implemented up to 1024 bits
[16] XCV400E only ECC in GF(2n) up to 255 bits
reference latency frequency area
RSA1024 ECC ECC (MHz)
CRT GF(p) GF(2n)
this work 4.0 ms 26.8 ms 21.8 ms 66 4826 CLBs
in GF(2251) 66 RAM blocks
66 mults
[3] 3.1 ms 63.7 6826 CLBs
[13] 2.6 ms 100.5 24767 slices
[16] 0.21 ms 76.7 3002 LUTs
in GF(2163) 1769 FFs
10 RAM blocks
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